Sovereign Default Reading List
Compiled by Gabriel Mihalache

This is a reading list I first compiled in January 2020, for my second year graduate class at Stony Brook University, ECO 613 Computational Macroeconomics. The focus is on "quantitative-theoretic" models and relevant data work. Suggestions and edits are welcome! Last lightly updated on August 2026. Back to my website.

Also available as a BibTex file: sov-debt-and-default.bib.

Benchmark Models and Theory

• Eaton, J., & Gersovitz, M. (1981). Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis. The Review of Economic Studies, 48(2), 289. DOI
• Bulow, J., & Rogoff, K. (1989). Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget? American Economic Review, 79(1), 43–50. DOI
• Cole, H. L., & Kehoe, T. (2000). Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises. Review of Economic Studies, 67(1), 91–116. DOI
• Aguiar, M., & Gopinath, G. (2006). Defaultable debt, interest rates and the current account. Journal of International Economics, 69(1), 64–83. DOI
• Arellano, C. (2008). Default Risk and Income Fluctuations in Emerging Economies. American Economic Review, 98(3), 690–712. DOI
• Chatterjee, S., & Eyigungor, B. (2012). Maturity, Indebtedness, and Default Risk. American Economic Review, 102(6), 2674–2699. DOI
• Aguiar, M., Chatterjee, S., Cole, H., & Stangebye, Z. (2016). Quantitative Models of Sovereign Debt Crises. Handbook of Macroeconomics, 1697–1755. DOI
• Auclert, A., & Rognlie, M. (2016). Unique equilibrium in the Eaton–Gersovitz model of sovereign debt. Journal of Monetary Economics, 84, 134–146. DOI
• Aguiar, M., & Amador, M. (2019). A contraction for sovereign debt models. Journal of Economic Theory, 183, 842–875. DOI
• Lorenzoni, G., & Werning, I. (2019). Slow Moving Debt Crises. American Economic Review, 109(9), 3229–3263. DOI
• Paluszynski, R., & Stefanidis, G. (2023). Borrowing into debt crises. Quantitative Economics, 14(1), 277–308. DOI
• Xavier Mateos-Planas & Sean McCrary & José-Víctor Ríos-Rull & Adrien Wicht (2023). The Generalized Euler Equation and the Bankruptcy-Sovereign Default Problem. Working paper.

Evidence

• Neumeyer, P. A., & Perri, F. (2005). Business cycles in emerging economies: the role of interest rates. Journal of Monetary Economics, 52(2), 345–380. DOI
• Tomz, M., & Wright, M. L. J. (2007). Do Countries Default in “Bad Times”? Journal of the European Economic Association, 5(2–3), 352–360. DOI
• Gelos, R. G., Sahay, R., & Sandleris, G. (2011). Sovereign borrowing by developing countries: What determines market access? Journal of International Economics, 83(2), 243–254. DOI
• Cruces, J. J., & Trebesch, C. (2013). Sovereign Defaults: The Price of Haircuts. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 5(3), 85–117. DOI
• Tomz, M., & Wright, M. L. J. (2013). Empirical Research on Sovereign Debt and Default. Annual Review of Economics, 5(1), 247–272. DOI
• Alfaro, L., Kalemli-Ozcan, S., & Volosovych, V. (2014). Sovereigns, Upstream Capital Flows, and Global Imbalances. Journal of the European Economic Association, 12(5), 1240–1284. DOI
• Aguiar, M., Chatterjee, S., Cole, H., & Stangebye, Z. (2016). Quantitative Models of Sovereign Debt Crises. Handbook of Macroeconomics, 1697–1755. DOI
• Du, W., & Schreger, J. (2016). Local Currency Sovereign Risk. The Journal of Finance, 71(3), 1027–1070. DOI
• Reinhart, C. M., & Trebesch, C. (2016). Sovereign Debt Relief and its Aftermath. Journal of the European Economic Association, 14(1), 215–251. DOI
• Hebert, B. & Schreger, J. (2017). The Costs of Sovereign Default: Evidence from Argentina. American Economic Review, 107(10), 3119-3145. DOI
• Andrade, S. C., & Chhaochharia, V. (2018). The Costs of Sovereign Default: Evidence from the Stock Market. The Review of Financial Studies, 31(5), 1707–1751. DOI
• Chamon, M., Schumacher, J., & Trebesch, C. (2018). Foreign-law bonds: Can they reduce sovereign borrowing costs? Journal of International Economics, 114, 164–179. DOI
• Cheng, G., Diaz-Cassou, J., & Erce, A. (2018). The macroeconomic effects of official debt restructuring: evidence from the Paris Club. Oxford Economic Papers, 71(2), 344–363. DOI
• Meyer, J., Reinhart, C. M., & Trebesch, C. (2022). Sovereign Bonds Since Waterloo. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 137(3), 1615–1680. DOI
• Timothy J. Kehoe & Juan Pablo Nicolini (2022). A Monetary and Fiscal History of Latin America, 1960–2017. Website
• Mitchener, K. J., & Trebesch, C. (2023). Sovereign Debt in the Twenty-first Century. Journal of Economic Literature, 61(2), 565–623. DOI
• Asonuma, T., Chamon, M., Erce, A., & Sasahara, A. (2024). Costs of sovereign debt crises: Restructuring strategies and bank intermediation. Journal of International Economics, 152, DOI
• von Luckner, C. M. G., Meyer, J., Reinhart, C., & Trebesch, C. (2025). Sovereign Haircuts: 200 Years of Creditor Losses. IMF Economic Review, 73(1), 150–195. DOI
• Farah-Yacoub, J., von Luckner, C. M. G., & Reinhart, C. (2024). The Social Costs of Sovereign Default. Working paper.
• Sagawa, T. (2025). Sovereign Liquidity Shocks. Working paper.
• Fourakis, S., & Karabarbounis, L. (2026). The Puzzling Behavior of Spreads during Covid. Working paper.

Investment and Production

• Mendoza, E. G., & Yue, V. Z. (2012). A General Equilibrium Model of Sovereign Default and Business Cycles. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(2), 889–946. DOI
• Arellano, C., Bai, Y., & Mihalache, G. (2018). Default risk, sectoral reallocation, and persistent recessions. Journal of International Economics, 112, 182–199. DOI
• Gordon, G., & Guerron-Quintana, P. A. (2018). Dynamics of investment, debt, and default. Review of Economic Dynamics, 28, 71–95. DOI
• Park, J. (2017). Sovereign default and capital accumulation. Journal of International Economics, 106, 119–133. DOI
• Alessandria, G., Bai, Y., & Deng, M. (2020). Migration and sovereign default risk. Journal of Monetary Economics, 113, 1–22. DOI
• Galli, C. (2021). Self-fulfilling debt crises, fiscal policy and investment. Journal of International Economics, 131, 103475. DOI
• Esquivel, C. (2024). Underinvestment and capital misallocation under sovereign risk. Journal of International Economics, 151, 103973. DOI
• Esquivel, C. (2025). Sovereign risk and Dutch disease. Journal of Monetary Economics, 149, 103663. DOI
• Li, L., & Mihalache, G. (2025). Default and Development. Journal of International Economics, 155, 104089. DOI
• Song, I. & Mihalache, G. (2026). Insufficient or excessive investment under sovereign default risk. Journal of International Economics, 160, 104232, DOI
• Zhigang Feng & Manuel Santos (2023). Markov Perfect Equilibrium in Economies with Sovereign Default and Distortionary Taxation. Working paper.
• Carlos Esquivel (2024). The Sovereign Default Risk of Giant Oil Discoveries. Working paper.

Long-Term Debt, Reserves, and Maturity Choice

• Alfaro, L., & Kanczuk, F. (2009). Optimal reserve management and sovereign debt. Journal of International Economics, 77(1), 23–36. DOI
• Hatchondo, J. C., & Martinez, L. (2009). Long-duration bonds and sovereign defaults. Journal of International Economics, 79(1), 117–125. DOI
• Arellano, C., & Ramanarayanan, A. (2012). Default and the Maturity Structure in Sovereign Bonds. Journal of Political Economy, 120(2), 187–232. DOI
• Chatterjee, S., & Eyigungor, B. (2012). Maturity, Indebtedness, and Default Risk. American Economic Review, 102(6), 2674–2699. DOI
• Hatchondo, J. C., Martinez, L., & Sosa-Padilla, C. (2016). Debt Dilution and Sovereign Default Risk. Journal of Political Economy, 124(5), 1383–1422. DOI
• Bianchi, J., Hatchondo, J. C., & Martinez, L. (2018). International Reserves and Rollover Risk. American Economic Review, 108(9), 2629–2670. DOI
• Sánchez, J. M., Sapriza, H., & Yurdagul, E. (2018). Sovereign default and maturity choice. Journal of Monetary Economics, 95, 72–85. DOI
• Aguiar, M., Amador, M., Hopenhayn, H., & Werning, I. (2019). Take the Short Route: Equilibrium Default and Debt Maturity. Econometrica, 87(2), 423–462. DOI
• Bocola, L., & Dovis, A. (2019). Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises: A Quantitative Analysis. American Economic Review, 109(12), 4343–4377. DOI
• Mihalache, G. (2020). Sovereign default resolution through maturity extension. Journal of International Economics, 125, 103326. DOI
• Bianchi, J., & Sosa-Padilla, C. (2023). Reserve Accumulation, Macroeconomic Stabilization, and Sovereign Risk. Review of Economic Studies, 91(4), 2053–2103. DOI
• Sosa-Padilla, C., & Sturzenegger, F. (2023). Does it matter how central banks accumulate reserves? Evidence from sovereign spreads. Journal of International Economics, 140, 103711. DOI
• Tavares, T. (2025). The role of international reserves in sovereign debt restructuring under fiscal adjustment. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 174, 105080. DOI
• Barbosa-Alves, M., Bianchi, J., & Sosa-Padilla, C. (2026). International Reserve Management under Rollover Crises. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 141(3), 2269–2311. DOI
• Radoslaw Paluszynski (2022). The Ultralong Sovereign Default Risk. Working paper.

Self-fulfilling Crises and Multiplicity

• Calvo, Guillermo A. (1988). Servicing the Public Debt: The Role of Expectations. American Economic Review. DOI
• Cole, H. L., & Kehoe, T. (2000). Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises. Review of Economic Studies, 67(1), 91–116. DOI
• Conesa, J. C., & Kehoe, T. J. (2017). Gambling for redemption and self-fulfilling debt crises. Economic Theory, 64(4), 707–740. DOI
• Ayres, J., Navarro, G., Nicolini, J. P., & Teles, P. (2018). Sovereign default: The role of expectations. Journal of Economic Theory, 175, 803–812. DOI
• Bocola, L., & Dovis, A. (2019). Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises: A Quantitative Analysis. American Economic Review, 109(12), 4343–4377. DOI
• Lorenzoni, G., & Werning, I. (2019). Slow Moving Debt Crises. American Economic Review, 109(9), 3229–3263. DOI
• Aguiar, M., & Amador, M. (2020). Self-Fulfilling Debt Dilution: Maturity and Multiplicity in Debt Models. American Economic Review, 110(9), 2783–2818. DOI
• Stangebye, Z. R. (2020). Beliefs and long-maturity sovereign debt. Journal of International Economics, 127, 103381. DOI
• Bianchi, J., & Mondragon, J. (2021). Monetary Independence and Rollover Crises. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 137(1), 435–491. DOI
• Galli, C. (2021). Self-fulfilling debt crises, fiscal policy and investment. Journal of International Economics, 131, 103475. DOI
• Mark Aguiar & Satyajit Chatterjee & Harold Cole & Zachary Stangebye (2022). Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises, Revisited. Journal of Political Economy. DOI
• Corsetti, G., & Maeng, F. S. (2024). Debt Crises, Fast and Slow. Journal of the European Economic Association, 22(5), 2148–2179. DOI
• Ayres, J., Navarro, G., Nicolini, J. P., & Teles, P. (2025). Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises with Long Stagnations. Journal of Political Economy, 133(12), 4050–4101. DOI
• Barbosa-Alves, M., Bianchi, J., & Sosa-Padilla, C. (2026). International Reserve Management under Rollover Crises. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 141(3), 2269–2311. DOI
• Moon, S. (2026). Official Lending and Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises. Working paper.

Recovery, Renegotiation, and Haircuts

• Yue, V. Z. (2010). Sovereign default and debt renegotiation. Journal of International Economics, 80(2), 176–187. DOI
• Pitchford, R., & Wright, M. L. J. (2011). Holdouts in Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Theory of Negotiation in a Weak Contractual Environment. The Review of Economic Studies, 79(2), 812–837. DOI
• Hatchondo, J. C., Martinez, L., & Sosa Padilla, C. (2014). Voluntary sovereign debt exchanges. Journal of Monetary Economics, 61, 32–50. DOI
• Asonuma, T., & Trebesch, C. (2016). Sovereign Debt Restructurings: Preemptive or Post-Default. Journal of the European Economic Association, 14(1), 175–214. DOI
• Asonuma, T., & Joo, H. (2020). Sovereign Debt Restructurings: Delays in Renegotiations and Risk Averse Creditors. Journal of the European Economic Association, 18(5), 2394–2440. DOI
• Mihalache, G. (2020). Sovereign default resolution through maturity extension. Journal of International Economics, 125, 103326. DOI
• Dvorkin, M., Sánchez, J. M., Sapriza, H., & Yurdagul, E. (2021). Sovereign Debt Restructurings. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 13(2), 26–77. DOI
• Arellano, C., Bai, Y., & Mihalache, G. (2023). Deadly Debt Crises: COVID-19 in Emerging Markets. Review of Economic Studies, 91(3), 1243–1290. DOI
• Arellano, C., Mateos-Planas, X., & Ríos-Rull, J.-V. (2023). Partial Default. Journal of Political Economy, 131(6), 1385–1439. DOI
• Asonuma, T., Niepelt, D., & Ranciere, R. (2023). Sovereign bond prices, haircuts and maturity. Journal of International Economics, 140, 103689. DOI
• Cristina Arellano & Yan Bai & Sandra Lizarazo (2017). Sovereign Risk Contagion. Working paper.
• Xiaohan Wang (2019). Renegotiation After Sovereign Default: Bygones No Longer. Working paper.
• Juan C. Hatchondo & Leonardo Martinez & Cesar Sosa-Padilla (2023). Sovereign Debt Standstills. Working paper.

Official, Multilateral, and Bilateral Lending

• Cheng, G., Diaz-Cassou, J., & Erce, A. (2018). The macroeconomic effects of official debt restructuring: evidence from the Paris Club. Oxford Economic Papers, 71(2), 344–363. DOI
• Gelpern, A., Horn, S., Morris, S., Parks, B., & Trebesch, C. (2023). How China Lends: A Rare Look into 100 Debt Contracts with Foreign Governments. Economic Policy, 38(114), 345–416. DOI
• Arellano, C., & Barreto, L. (2025). Official Sovereign Debt. Working paper.
• Moon, S. (2026). Official Lending and Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises. Working paper.
• Roldán, F., & Sosa-Padilla, C. (2026). The Perils of Bilateral Sovereign Debt. Working paper.

Monetary Models

• Corsetti, G., & Dedola, L. (2016). The Mystery of the Printing Press: Monetary Policy and Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises. Journal of the European Economic Association, 14(6), 1329–1371. DOI
• Bacchetta, P., Perazzi, E., & van Wincoop, E. (2018). Self-fulfilling debt crises: What can monetary policy do? Journal of International Economics, 110, 119–134. DOI
• Na, S., Schmitt-Grohé, S., Uribe, M., & Yue, V. (2018). The Twin Ds: Optimal Default and Devaluation. American Economic Review, 108(7), 1773–1819. DOI
• Ottonello, P., & Perez, D. J. (2019). The Currency Composition of Sovereign Debt. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 11(3), 174–208. DOI
• Bianchi, J., & Mondragon, J. (2021). Monetary Independence and Rollover Crises. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 137(1), 435–491. DOI
• Hurtado, S., Nuño, G., & Thomas, C. (2022). Monetary Policy and Sovereign Debt Sustainability. Journal of the European Economic Association, 21(1), 293–325. DOI
• Espino, E., Kozlowski, J., Martin, F. M., & Sánchez, J. M. (2025). Domestic Policies and Sovereign Default. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 17(3), 74–113. DOI
• Arellano, C., Bai, Y., & Mihalache, G. (2026). Monetary Policy and Sovereign Risk in Emerging Economies (NK-Default). The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 141(2), 1635–1703. DOI
• Fabrizio Perri & Sewon Hur & Illenin O. Kondo (2018). Real Interest Rates, Inflation, and Default. Working paper.

Lenders, Global Factors

• Longstaff, F. A., Pan, J., Pedersen, L. H., & Singleton, K. J. (2011). How Sovereign Is Sovereign Credit Risk? American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 3(2), 75–103. DOI
• Lizarazo, S. V. (2013). Default risk and risk averse international investors. Journal of International Economics, 89(2), 317–330. DOI
• Aguiar, M., Chatterjee, S., Cole, H., & Stangebye, Z. (2016). Quantitative Models of Sovereign Debt Crises. Handbook of Macroeconomics, 1697–1755. DOI
• Johri, A., Khan, S., & Sosa-Padilla, C. (2022). Interest rate uncertainty and sovereign default risk. Journal of International Economics, 139, 103681. DOI
• Morelli, J. M., Ottonello, P., & Perez, D. J. (2022). Global Banks and Systemic Debt Crises. Econometrica, 90(2), 749–798. DOI
• Andrade, S. C., Ekponon, A., & Jeanneret, A. (2023). Sovereign risk premia and global macroeconomic conditions. Journal of Financial Economics, 147(1), 172–197. DOI
• Fang, X., Hardy, B., & Lewis, K. K. (2025). Who Holds Sovereign Debt and Why It Matters. The Review of Financial Studies, 38(8), 2326–2361. DOI
• Serkan Arslanalp & Takahiro Tsuda (2014). Tracking global demand for emerging market sovereign debt. Working paper.
• Nicola Borri & Adrien Verdelhan (2011). Sovereign Risk Premia. Working paper.
• Yan Bai, Patrick Kehoe, Peirlauro Lopez & Fabrizio Perri (2024). World Financial Cycles. Working paper.
• Victor Almeida, Carlos Esquivel, Timothy E. Kehoe & Juan Pablo Nicolini (2024). Default and Interest Rate Shocks: Renegotiation Matters. Working paper.

Primary and Secondary Markets

• Bulow, J., Rogoff, K., & Dornbusch, R. (1988). The Buyback Boondoggle. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1988(2), 675. DOI
• Broner, F., Martin, A., & Ventura, J. (2010). Sovereign Risk and Secondary Markets. American Economic Review, 100(4), 1523–1555. DOI
• Aguiar, M., Amador, M., Hopenhayn, H., & Werning, I. (2019). Take the Short Route: Equilibrium Default and Debt Maturity. Econometrica, 87(2), 423–462. DOI
• Cole, H., Neuhann, D., & Ordoñez, G. (2022). Asymmetric Information and Sovereign Debt: Theory Meets Mexican Data. Journal of Political Economy, 130(8), 2055–2109. DOI
• Cole, H. L., Neuhann, D., & Ordoñez, G. (2024). Information Spillovers and Sovereign Debt: Theory Meets the Eurozone Crisis. Review of Economic Studies. DOI
• Gaston Chaumont (2019). Sovereign Debt, Default Risk, and the Liquidity of Government Bonds. Working paper.
• Ricardo Alves Monteiro & Stelios Fourakis (2024). Sovereign Debt Auctions with Strategic Interactions. Working paper.
• Sandro C. Andrade & Felipe M. Da Rocha (2026). On the Intermediation Cost of Public Debt. Working paper.

Sovereign Risk Pass-through and the "Doom Loop"

• Gennaioli, N., Martin, A., & Rossi, S. (2014). Sovereign Default, Domestic Banks, and Financial Institutions. The Journal of Finance, 69(2), 819–866. DOI
• Bocola, L. (2016). The Pass-Through of Sovereign Risk. Journal of Political Economy, 124(4), 879–926. DOI
• Brunnermeier, M. K., Garicano, L., Lane, P. R., Pagano, M., Reis, R., Santos, T., Thesmar, D., Van Nieuwerburgh, S., & Vayanos, D. (2016). The Sovereign-Bank Diabolic Loop and ESBies. American Economic Review, 106(5), 508–512. DOI
• Sosa-Padilla, C. (2018). Sovereign defaults and banking crises. Journal of Monetary Economics, 99, 88–105. DOI
• Hassan, T. A., Schreger, J., Schwedeler, M., & Tahoun, A. (2024). Sources and Transmission of Country Risk. The Review of Economic Studies, 91(4), 2307–2346. DOI
• Roldán, F. (2025). The Aggregate-Demand Doom Loop: Precautionary Motives and the Welfare Costs of Sovereign Risk. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 17(3), 160–204. DOI
• Arellano, C., Bai, Y., & Bocola, L. (2026). Sovereign Default Risk and Firm Heterogeneity. Journal of the European Economic Association. DOI
• Hur, S., Sosa-Padilla, C., & Yom, Z. (2026). Optimal Bailouts in Banking and Sovereign Crises. Journal of International Economics, 162, 104283. DOI

Political Economy

• Cuadra, G., & Sapriza, H. (2008). Sovereign default, interest rates and political uncertainty in emerging markets. Journal of International Economics, 76(1), 78–88. DOI
• Hatchondo, J. C., Martinez, L., & Sapriza, H. (2009). Heterogenous Borrowers in Quantitative Models of Sovereign Default. International Economic Review, 50(4), 1129–1151. DOI
• Scholl, A. (2017). The dynamics of sovereign default risk and political turnover. Journal of International Economics, 108, 37–53. DOI
• Chatterjee, S., & Eyigungor, B. (2019). Endogenous political turnover and fluctuations in sovereign default risk. Journal of International Economics, 117, 37–50. DOI
• Aguiar, M., Amador, M., & Fourakis, S. (2020). On the Welfare Losses from External Sovereign Borrowing. IMF Economic Review, 68(1), 163–194. DOI
• Azzimonti, M., & Mitra, N. (2023). Political constraints and sovereign default. Journal of International Money and Finance, 137, 102895. DOI
• Azzimonti, M., & Quadrini, V. (2023). International Spillovers and Bailouts. Review of Economic Studies, 91(1), 77–128. DOI
• Cotoc, J., Johri, A. & Sosa-Padilla, C. (2025). Sovereign spreads and the political leaning of nations. International Economic Review, 66(2), 687-709. DOI.

Fiscal Policy

• Cuadra, G., Sanchez, J. M., & Sapriza, H. (2010). Fiscal policy and default risk in emerging markets. Review of Economic Dynamics, 13(2), 452–469. DOI
• Arellano, C., & Bai, Y. (2016). Fiscal austerity during debt crises. Economic Theory, 64(4), 657–673. DOI
• de-Córdoba, G. F., Pujolas, P. S., & Torres, J. L. (2017). Fiscal discipline and defaults. Review of Economic Dynamics, 24, 1–13. DOI
• Hatchondo, J. C., Martinez, L., & Roch, F. (2022). Fiscal Rules and the Sovereign Default Premium. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 14(4), 244–273. DOI
• Bianchi, J., Ottonello, P., & Presno, I. (2023). Fiscal Stimulus under Sovereign Risk. Journal of Political Economy, 131(9), 2328–2369. DOI
• Espino, E., Kozlowski, J., Martin, F. M., & Sánchez, J. M. (2025). Domestic Policies and Sovereign Default. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 17(3), 74–113. DOI

Domestic Heterogeneity, Inequality

• D’Erasmo, P., & Mendoza, E. G. (2016). Distributional Incentives in an Equilibrium Model of Domestic Sovereign Default. Journal of the European Economic Association, 14(1), 7–44. DOI
• Jeon, K., & Kabukcuoglu, Z. (2018). Income inequality and sovereign default. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 95, 211–232. DOI
• D’Erasmo, P., & Mendoza, E. G. (2021). History remembered: Optimal sovereign default on domestic and external debt. Journal of Monetary Economics, 117, 969–989. DOI
• Deng, M. (2024). Inequality, Taxation, and Sovereign Default Risk. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 16(2), 217–249. DOI

Optimal Contracting, Commitment

• Adam, K., & Grill, M. (2017). Optimal Sovereign Default. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 9(1), 128–164. DOI
• Dovis, A. (2018). Efficient Sovereign Default. The Review of Economic Studies. DOI
• Aguiar, M., & Amador, M. (2019). A contraction for sovereign debt models. Journal of Economic Theory, 183, 842–875. DOI
• Müller, A., Storesletten, K., & Zilibotti, F. (2019). Sovereign Debt and Structural Reforms. American Economic Review, 109(12), 4220–4259. DOI
• Ábrahám, Á., Carceles-Poveda, E., Liu, Y., & Marimon, R. (2025). On the optimal design of a Financial Stability Fund. The Review of Economic Studies. DOI
• Mateos-Planas, X., McCrary, S., Ríos-Rull, J.-V., & Wicht, A. (2025). Commitment in the canonical sovereign default model. Journal of International Economics. DOI
• Juan Hatchondo & Francisco Roch & Leonardo Martinez (2019). Constrained efficient borrowing with sovereign default risk. Working paper.

Computation

• Hatchondo, J. C., Martinez, L., & Sapriza, H. (2010). Quantitative properties of sovereign default models: Solution methods matter. Review of Economic Dynamics, 13(4), 919–933. DOI
• Chatterjee, S., & Eyigungor, B. (2012). Maturity, Indebtedness, and Default Risk. American Economic Review, 102(6), 2674–2699. DOI
• Dvorkin, M., Sánchez, J. M., Sapriza, H., & Yurdagul, E. (2021). Sovereign Debt Restructurings. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 13(2), 26–77. DOI
• Gu, G. W., & Stangebye, Z. R. (2023). Costly Information and Sovereign Risk. International Economic Review, 64(4), 1397–1429. DOI
• Mihalache, G. (2025). Solving default models. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Economics and Finance. DOI

Optimal Maturity in the Closed Economy

• Angeletos, G.-M. (2002). Fiscal Policy with Noncontingent Debt and the Optimal Maturity Structure. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(3), 1105–1131. DOI
• Bhandari, A., Evans, D., Golosov, M., & Sargent, T. J. (2016). Fiscal Policy and Debt Management with Incomplete Markets. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 132(2), 617–663. DOI
• Faraglia, E., Marcet, A., Oikonomou, R., & Scott, A. (2018). Government Debt Management: The Long and the Short of It. The Review of Economic Studies, 86(6), 2554–2604. DOI
• Bigio, S., Nuño, G., & Passadore, J. (2023). Debt-Maturity Management with Liquidity Costs. Journal of Political Economy Macroeconomics, 1(1), 119–190. DOI
• Aparisi de Lannoy, L., Bhandari, A., Evans, D., Golosov, M., & Sargent, T. J. (2025). Managing Public Portfolios. Journal of Political Economy, 133(12), 3903–3951. DOI
• Bigio, S., & Nuño, G. (2026). Decomposing Optimal Debt Maturity. Working paper.

Continuous Time Methods

• Bornstein, G. (2020). A Continuous-Time Model of Sovereign Debt. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 118, 103963. DOI
• Hurtado, S., Nuño, G., & Thomas, C. (2022). Monetary Policy and Sovereign Debt Sustainability. Journal of the European Economic Association, 21(1), 293–325. DOI
• Rebelo, S., Wang, N., & Yang, J. Rare Disasters, Financial Development, and Sovereign Debt. The Journal of Finance, 77(5), 2719–2764. DOI
• Bigio, S., Nuño, G., & Passadore, J. (2023). Debt-Maturity Management with Liquidity Costs. Journal of Political Economy Macroeconomics, 1(1), 119–190. DOI
• Fabrice Tourre (2017). A Macro-Finance Approach to Sovereign Debt Spreads and Returns. Working paper.
• Bigio, S., & Nuño, G. (2026). Decomposing Optimal Debt Maturity. Working paper.

Learning, Reputation, and Ambiguity

• Pouzo, D., & Presno, I. (2016). Sovereign Default Risk and Uncertainty Premia. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 8(3), 230–266. DOI
• Bassetto, M., & Galli, C. (2019). Is Inflation Default? The Role of Information in Debt Crises. American Economic Review, 109(10), 3556–3584. DOI
• Amador, M., & Phelan, C. (2021). Reputation and Sovereign Default. Econometrica, 89(4), 1979–2010. DOI
• Amador, M., & Phelan, C. (2023). Reputation and Partial Default. American Economic Review: Insights, 5(2), 158–72. DOI
• Morelli, J. M., & Moretti, M. (2023). Information Frictions, Reputation, and Sovereign Spreads. Journal of Political Economy, 131(11), 3066–3102. DOI
• Paluszynski, R. (2023). Learning about Debt Crises. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 15(1), 106–134. DOI
• Roch, F., & Roldán, F. (2023). Uncertainty, Sovereign Default Risk, and State-Contingent Debt. Journal of Political Economy Macroeconomics, 1(2), 334–370. DOI
• Marcos Chamon & Francisco Roldán (2024). Sovereign Debt Tolerance with Potentially Permanent Costs of Default. IMF Economic Review. DOI
• Fourakis, F. (2024). Sovereign Default and Government Reputation. Working paper.
• Stangebye, Z. R., & Wright, M. L. J. (2026). Living in Infamy: Bad Reputations in Emerging Markets. Working paper.

Legal and Contractual Aspects

• Buchheit, L. C., & Gulati, G. M. (2000). Exit Consents in Sovereign Bond Exchanges. UCLA Law Review, 48, 59–84.
• Rogoff, K., & Zettelmeyer, J. (2002). Bankruptcy Procedures for Sovereigns: A History of Ideas, 1976–2001. IMF Staff Papers, 49(3), 470–507. DOI
• Buchheit, L. C., & Pam, J. S. (2004). The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments. Emory Law Journal, 53, 869–922.
• Eichengreen, B., & Mody, A. (2004). Do Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs? The Economic Journal, 114(495), 247–264. DOI
• Sturzenegger, F., & Zettelmeyer, J. (2006). Debt Defaults and Lessons from a Decade of Crises. MIT Press. Website
• Panizza, U., Sturzenegger, F., & Zettelmeyer, J. (2009). The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt and Default. Journal of Economic Literature, 47(3), 651–698. DOI
• Gulati, M., & Scott, R. E. (2013). The Three and a Half Minute Transaction: Boilerplate and the Limits of Contract Design. University of Chicago Press. Website
• Sobel, M. (2016). Strengthening collective action clauses: catalysing change—the back story. Capital Markets Law Journal. DOI
• Schumacher, J., Trebesch, C., & Enderlein, H. (2021). Sovereign defaults in court. Journal of International Economics, 131, 103388. DOI
• Gelpern, A., Horn, S., Morris, S., Parks, B., & Trebesch, C. (2023). How China Lends: A Rare Look into 100 Debt Contracts with Foreign Governments. Economic Policy, 38(114), 345–416. DOI
• Grund, S. (2023). Sovereign Debt Restructuring and the Law: The Holdout Creditor Problem in Argentina and Greece. Routledge. Website
• Martinez, L., Roch, F., Roldán, F., & Zettelmeyer, J. (2023). Sovereign debt. Research Handbook of Financial Markets, 378–405. DOI
• Makoff, G. (2024). Default: The Landmark Court Battle over Argentina's $100 Billion Debt Restructuring. Georgetown University Press. Website
• Carlo Galli & Stéphane Guibaud (2026). Majority Voting in Sovereign Restructurings: The Aggregation Dilemma. Working paper.

Also available as a BibTex file: sov-debt-and-default.bib.

Back to my website